Abstract-In a designated verifier signature scheme, only the designated person can verify the validity of the signature. Due to such attribute, it could be used in many fields such as financial payment system, e-voting, and e-taxation. Recently, Lee et al. proposed an identity based signature scheme to overcome weaknesses in previous schemes. In this paper, we will point out that Lee et al.'s scheme suffers from two kinds of attacks. To enhance security, an improved scheme will be also proposed. Security analysis shows that that the proposed scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model and could overcome weaknesses in Lee et al.'s scheme. Performance analysis demonstrates that our scheme could overcome weaknesses in Lee et al.'s weaknesses at the cost of increasing computational cost slightly.
INTRODUCTION
With the development of the Internet, digital signature is widely used in many fields, So we need to change something to adapt to the special environment conditions. In some scenarios such as e-voting [1, 2] , they want that only the system can verify the valid of their signature. For this reason, normal digital signature which anyone can know the original signer's attitude is not suitable.
To solve this problem, Jakobsson et al. introduced the concept of designated verifier signature (DVS) in 1996 [3] . This ensures that any third party cannot get any useful knowledge of the signed information, and the signer cannot deny the fact that he has signed the message when the signature is valid.
In order to improve the security and efficiency of DVS scheme, Saeednia et al. [4] formalized the strong DVS notation and proposed a novel scheme in 2003. Many kinds of new DVS schemes were proposed [5, 6, 7, 8, 9] following that. In 2009, Kang et al. [10] proposed a scheme with new construction and Yoon gave another secure and effective scheme in 2011. Unfortunately, Lee et al. point out that Yoon's scheme is vulnerable to replay-attack. It is easy to be forged for the third part when it intercepts the signature through controlling the communication channel.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly introduce some knowledge about bilinear pairing and some necessary security notions
A. Bilinear Pairing
Let (
G × be two cyclic groups over an elliptic curve which have the same prime order q . And P denotes the generator of 1 G . A bilinear map:
satisfies the following properties:
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, , Definition2. Bilinear Diffie-Hellman(BDH) assumption states that in probabilistic polynomial time , there is no algorithms which can solve BDHP with non-negligible advantage.
B. Security Model
Before introducing the security model of our scheme, some notations are defined in as follows.
• C : an adversary who can forge the signature with an unnegligible advantage;
• Λ : an algorithm which simulates with the adversary C to solve BDHP; If there is an adversary C can forge the signature with non-negligible advantage, we could construct an algorithm Λ which can solve BDHP through the following game.
Initially, the adversary C gets the system parameter.
The algorithm Λ answers C 's queries by using any reasonable data instead of the signer. When C queries secret information including the users' private key, the game aborts and fails.
We could solve BDHP through the following game by two signatures which are generated by the adversary using the same message.
III. REVIEW OF LEE ET AL.'S SCHEME
In the Scheme of Lee et al,We assume that there are two candidates in the scheme: the signer Alice and the verifier Bob. The details are described in the following.
A. Setup Phase
In this phase, the PKG (private key generator centre) has to choose two cyclic groups: (
G × , where q is the common order of the two groups and define the bilinear paring map as
. Then the PKG generates the master secret key * S Zq ∈ and two one-way hash functions:
as its system parameters. At last, the PKG publishes the system public
B. Key-Extract Phase
Everyone has a unique ID which can be used to calculate their public key 1 ( ) H ID . Taking the user's ID as input, the PKG outputs the user's private key 1 ( )
ID s s H ID = ⋅
and sends it to the user though the secure channel.
C. Sign Phase
When Alice wants to make a signature,he has to compute . So when the adversary intercepts one signature created by Alice, he can forge any signatures. What is more, the timestamp T is useless and can be instead easily in the scheme.
V. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME

A. Description of Our Proposed Scheme
In this subsection, we will construct a new scheme. Like Lee's scheme, our scheme is also composed of five phases. Alice and Bob are the signer and the verifier, respectively.
(1) Setup phase Firstly the PKG has to choose two cyclic groups: ( )
.Then it generates the system parameters including master secret key * q s Z ∈ and three one-way hash functions 1 
The definition of hash functions are :
. The public key of the PKG is pub P sP = where P is a generator in. 
B. Security Analysis of The Proposed Scheme
In this subsection, we will do security analysis of our scheme.
(1) Correctness. In our schemes, the signature ( Proof: In our proof, there are three participators including the signer Alice, the verifier Bob and the adversary C . Algorithm Λ will replace the adversary C 's interaction with the signer by simulation. In the simulation, the algorithm Λ can provide any information that the adversary queries except the signature on the message m .
Initially, the adversary C   gets   1  2  1  2  3 { , , , , , 
C. Efficiency Analysis
In this subsection, we will give a performance comparison between our scheme and the related DVS schemes which need to use bilinear pairing. The main calculates in the schemes include pairing operation Table 1 as follows. Table 1 , we could get the computational cost of our scheme is slightly higher than that of Lee et al.'s scheme. It is well known that the security is the first important for cryptographic scheme. Therefore, it is acceptable to enhance security at the cost of increasing computational cost slightly.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyze the weaknesses of Lee et al.'s scheme carefully. After that, we propose two kinds of attacks against their scheme. Finally, we construct a new DVS scheme which can withstand those two attacks. Although our scheme seems less efficient, it processes higher security level.
